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 An analysis of the impact of negative CSR 'Forced Labour' parameter on the 
profitability of Supply Chain Contracts 
 
Abstract.  
This paper provides a mathematical model to analyse the impact of a negative corporate social responsibility 
(CSR) parameter that for ‘forced labour’, on supply chain profitability based on coordination contracts. Four types 
of supply chain coordination contract are developed and benchmarked against set performance indices employing 
sensitivity analysis and non-linear optimization techniques. Nash ‘static’ and Stackelberg ‘dynamic’ models are 
employed to represent the ‘gameplay’ between the ‘manufacturer’ and ‘retailer’ in a supply chain. The key inputs 
are average demand and ‘forced labour’ ratios, whereas key performance indicators are advertising, inventory and 
pricing costs. 
Our results indicate that by reducing the proportion of ‘forced labour’ for both members of the supply chain, the 
overall profitability increases in a Nash static gaming context. However, the contractual relationships in a 
Stackelberg dynamic situation provide a different picture. Here, if the ‘retailer’ assumes the leadership role, cost-
sharing contracts increase the profitability for both partners. However, if the ‘manufacturer’ assumes the leader, 
the profit-sharing contract leads to the highest overall profit. Furthermore, sensitivity analysis confirms that an 
ideal situation is one in which the ‘forced labour’ ratio approaches ‘zero’, where the profitability of the retailer is 
usually higher than that of the manufacturer. Previous researchers have used ‘survey-based’ methods to develop 
proportional or ‘mediating’ relationships to measure the impact of CSR on supply chain profitability. This paper 
addresses the associated gap by providing a game theoretic-based non-linear mathematical model to assess the 
direct impact of negative CSR on supply chain profitability and benchmarks the performance of different supply 
chain contracts.  





Corporate social responsibility (CSR) is defined as “a social and ethical behaviour against stakeholders that 
enhances society's welfare and some standards have been edited for it through laws and guidelines” (ISO 26000, 
Working Group on Social Responsibility, 2007). Few scholars have considered CSR in the field of social 
responsibility and innovation in the supply chain (Seuring and Müller, 2008; Ashby et al., 2012; Ahi and Searcy, 
2015; Puska et al., 2018; Fazlollahtabar 2018; Lukovac and Popovic, 2018). Corporate Social Responsibility in a 
supply chain (SC) context is defined as the social and ethical behaviour of SC members towards all stakeholders, 
which includes shareholders, end customers, employees and managers (Panda, 2014). In SC modelling, 
quantitative and measurable variables are necessary to measure CSR. There are various references that classify 
social responsibility indicators, including the Global Reporting Initiative which classifies labour practices, good 
and suitable work, human rights, products, and social responsibility. Several indicators have been investigated 
using quantitative measures of social responsibility such as vacation, staff turnover, wage level of sexes, and 
promotion rate (Katsikea et al., 2014; Kwon & Milgrom, 2014; Mani et al., 2014; Simoes et al., 2016; Strandberg 
et al., 2017). From the supply chain perspective, the collaborated network is primarily designed to improve 
communication amongst its members by developing long-term relationships to increase their profit margins 
(Govindan et al., 2012). In reality, a decision made by one member can easily have an impact on other members 
of the supply chain (Heydari, 2014). Many studies have indicated that a conflicting approach can increase the 
profitability of one member at the expense of others (Jia et al., 2013; Mahdiraji et al., 2014, 2015 and 2019); 
however, a cooperative decision-making approach enhances the overall profitability of all members. Coordination 
network models have been developed to motivate all members or players to make optimal decisions and resolve 
any conflicts that exist. In this regard, game theory methodology has been used to investigate the pay-off function 
in the instance of a conflict between two or more players (Mahdiraji et al., 2015). In non-cooperative games, 
whilst the bargaining power of different players is equal, the game is termed as Nash (Mahdiraji et al, 2014). 
However, when one player dominates the market or SC and is considered to be the leader, and where the other(s) 
obey as follower(s), it is termed Stackelberg (Jia et al, 2013). On the other hand, cooperative games employ 
coordination contracts as a recognized tool that takes into account all members’ dilemmas (Xu et al., 2017). 
Coordination contracts such as profit sharing, revenue sharing, cost-sharing, buy-back, quantity discount, two-
part tariff, etc., not only assume SC members’ individual targets but also lead to overall higher performance (see, 
for example, Wang et al., 2013; Goering, 2012; Panda et al., 2017; Raj et al., 2018; Ma et al., 2017). 
Our extant literature review indicates that in the vast majority of cases, CSR has been considered to be a qualitative 
factor only, and not has been considered as a quantitative decision-making variable in a mathematical treatise. 
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Among CSR’s various key indicators, in this research forced labour has been identified as the most prominent 
indicator of SC members (Mahdiraji et al., 2019). The forced labour ratio, herein labelled 𝐵𝐿 , is defined as 
the registered percentage of forced labour in the SC (Mani et al., 2014). From the SC point of view, supply chains 
usually aim to maximize their overall profit by engaging an inappropriate target and distribute equitable shares to 
all parties. Hence, considering a chosen CSR indicator in a market and demand function, how the outcomes and 
payoff functions for different members in a chain will alternate? Moreover, how the changes in the CSR indicator 
affects different coordination contracts structure and model? Alongside with, which coordination contract and 
which player benefits more for different amounts of CSR indicator? Eventually, what are the appropriate 
conditions, contracts and CSR indicator values for gaining higher value for supply chain overall profit? Therefore, 
this research is concerned with the modelling and optimization of the profit margin of the supply chain, as 
consisting of a retailer and a manufacturer whilst they are engaged in a ‘forced labour’ negative CSR publicity 
situation.   
In our proposed approach, the demand function has used the social responsibility measurement index. In fact, 
besides price and advertisement factors, demand also depends on the manufacturer's social responsibility 
performance. Considering a specific CSR index in the demand function, by preparing a suitable tool to analyse 
the effects of CSR on each member and the SC’s overall profit, has, to our knowledge, never been previously 
considered in any related research. In particular, four coordination contracts, namely profit sharing, revenue 
sharing, cost sharing, and two-part tariff, are modelled, optimized and examined, considering Nash bargaining 
and Stackelberg leadership scenarios. Note that the authors determine optimal pricing, ordering, advertising and 
social responsibility policies under Nash static game conditions, where each supply chain member enjoys equal 
bargaining power. Further, the authors evaluate the same scenarios under Stackelberg's dynamic situation, where 
members enjoy asymmetric bargaining power. The researchers examine the profitability of these contracts whilst 
the SC is undergoing the various levels of negative CSR publicity due to the forced labour issues identified. The 
overall research framework is illustrated in Figure1.  
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Figure 1. Research Framework  
The structure of the paper is organized as follows. At first, the relevant literature in the field of CSR is presented 
and the different coordination contracts employed in SC are presented. Secondly, a research methodology is 
proposed, and the initial conditions and assumptions made are outlined. Subsequently, relevant symbols, the profit 
function of each player, concavity, the output response for each member, and parameters to determine the optimal 
solution are discussed. Finally, the model is tested using a numerical example and a sensitivity analysis of 
corporate social responsibility will be presented. 
2. Coordination contracts in the Supply Chain: A literature review  
Supply chain management is to line the associated material flow coordination and inventory policies in order to 
maximize its profit. The planning of important decisions in a multi-echelon chain could affect all the levels and 
the SC as a whole (Stadtler, Kilger, 2007). If each player (or company) creates their own inventory, pricing, and 
advertising policies whilst ignoring the others, the supply will not be able to meet the demand cycle. This results 
in extreme financial and non-financial challenges resulting in, for example, loss of profit, loss of customer loyalty, 
bad repute and, in extreme situations, the total loss of the business. In order to avoid this, supply chains adopt 
methods of coordination that require collaboration at different levels (Esmaeili et al., 2009; Mahdiraji et al., 2012 
and 2015). In a slow-moving supply chain, for example, the construction industry, chemical industry, or 
agriculture, the ‘demand pattern’ is highly predictable; therefore, revenue sharing, cost sharing, profit sharing, 
two-part tariff, etc., contracts are suitable. On the other hand, in a dynamic environment or fast-moving goods 
industry, with unpredictable demand (represented by probabilistic or stochastic functions), rebate contracts or 
buyback contracts are more appropriate (Mahdiraji et al., 2019). There are, however, some types of coordination 
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contract that are suitable for either situation. The researchers provide a summary of various coordination contract 
types that suit different demand patterns in Figure 2.  
 
Figure 2. Classification of Coordination Contracts based upon Deterministic/Stochastic Situation  
The researchers have conducted an in-depth review of the literature published since 2009 on coordination contracts 
in the supply chain. A summary of the literature review is provided in Table 1 under which the literature is grouped 
according to whether the CSR was part of the contract, levels of supply chain, the type of demand function (i.e., 
linear, deterministic, non-linear, stochastic), demand function variables (i.e., price, effort, quality, 
marketing/advertising, CSR/low carbon/green), planning horizon (i.e., single period or multi-period), and the main 
variables of the model (i.e., price, quality, advertising cost, share of income, order quantity, cost efficiency). The 
outcome of this review suggests that there are only a few examples where CSR has been addressed as demand 
parameters in these studies. For example, Hsueh (2014) evaluated a revenue-sharing contract model where he 
considered social responsibility as the demand-dependent variable to determine its impact on price/order quantity 
and revenue sharing. Ghosh and Shah (2015) considered a cost-sharing model of the impact of the ‘green variable’ 
as dependent on price/order quantity and measured the outcome of ‘green effort’ spent in an SC. Xu and Bai 
(2016) examined revenue sharing/two-part tariff (TPT) contracts to measure the impact of supply chain 
‘sustainability’ level and its impact on revenue/profitability. Zhou et al. (2016) considered the impact of ‘low 
carbon’ advertising and price escalation on cost-sharing contracts. Wang, Zhao and He (2016) studied the impact 
of ‘low-carbon’ advertising on a cost-sharing contract, whilst Peng, Pang, and Cong (2018) measured the 
‘emission reduction’ in SC with regard to the revenue sharing contract. More recently, Hong and Guo (2019) and 
Qian et al. (2020) examined the impact of green product and green marketing on price in cost-sharing and TPT 
contracts. 
In our extant literature review (Table 1 in Appendix 1), the researchers have identified sixteen different kinds of 
contracts that researchers have proposed in a supply-chain context. The researchers summarise this in pie chart 
format in Figure 3. For simplicity, the researchers have converted the numeric value of contract types (i.e., out of 
15) into a percentage. The authors identify that revenue sharing (29%), wholesale contract (23%), cost-sharing 
(8%), and buyback (5%) are the most representative types in the previous research.  
S/P (Stochastic or Probablisitc deamnd)
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• Subsidary Cost Sharing
• Quantity Flexible
• Buyback
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Figure 3. The contribution of different contracts of various supply chain coordination methods  
As indicated earlier, the authors have selected four types of coordination contract to examine the impact of 
negative CSR publicity arising from forced labour situations. Note that, considering the deterministic demand 
function type of this research (upon Figure 2), contracts suitable for uncertain demand functions were not usable. 
Thus, among the possible contracts for deterministic demand function, the most prominent contracts were chosen 
based on figure 3; each is explained briefly in the following. The mathematical formulation of these contracts is 
developed in sections three and four. 
[1]. Revenue sharing contract. This contract mainly applies to online businesses. In fact, this contract reduces 
the wholesale price and divides profit between the contractual parties according to their bargaining power 
(Krishnan & Winter, 2011; Sluis & Giovanni, 2016; Xie et al, 2017). 
[2]. Profit-sharing contract. This provides unequal profit sharing amongst the members, usually reflecting their 
bargaining power. The profit-sharing contract leads to higher coordination in SC and increases overall profit (see, 
for example, Jaber & Osman, 2006; Cao et al., 2015). 
[3]. Two-part tariff contract (TPT). The manufacturer offers a fixed price to the retailer in addition to the 
wholesale price. In fact, coordination will occur if the optimal price is equal to the price in two-part tariff 
conditions in the centralized mode (Xu et al, 2016). 
[4]. Cost-sharing contract. Suited to share the costs of research and development, marketing, energy storage, 


















































In summary, our literature review illustrates previous research that has examined supply chain contracts from a 
variety of dimensions, including variables, production type, cooperation status, SC levels, etc. (see Table 1 in 
Appendix 1). However, the authors note that all these researchers considered single product types, complete 
information games, and sensitivity analysis for validation. By comparing our proposed approach with similar 
research, the novelty and contribution of our own efforts are illustrated in the last row of Appendix 1. In particular, 
the multiplicity of the demand function, CSR issues (in particular, use of forced labour as a proxy to negative 
CSR), use of a measurement index of social responsibility, gaming approaches used, and the validation and 
verification approach that is employed make our research distinctive. Table 2 offers a summary of the main 
contributions presented in this paper. Note that, Nash and Stackelberg games are performed in many management 
and economic areas. However, the main focus of this research is the utilization of a CSR indicator to design 
coordination contracts in a two-echelon supply chain and to analyse the effects of this indicator on the profitability 
of players and the entire SC.  
Table 2. Comparative value and contribution made by this research  




 The previous research considered CSR to be a 
qualitative issue. CSR has not been: 
 Examined as a decision variable in a 
quantitative model;  
 Considered in coordination contracts; 
 Considered in terms of the overall 
profitability of a supply chain;   
 CSR is considered to be a quantitative decision-
making variable  
 A measuring index is developed for CSR as a 
function to measure and analyse the effect of CSR 
on supply chain profitability; 
 
Demand Function 
 Earlier research has considered demand function to 
be: 
 Deterministic    
 A simple regression   
 A nonlinear function dependent on price, 
advertising, etc.  
 The demand function is modelled as a three-
dimensional nonlinear function depending on 
price, marketing costs and CSR measuring index;  
 None of the previous research has considered a CSR 
in-demand function.  
Contracts and 
Game theory 
 Previous research considered contracts based upon 
Nash or Stackelberg Game conditions.  
 
 Four types of coordination contract are analysed 
including revenue sharing, cost sharing, profit 
sharing, and two-part tariff; 
 All contracts were benchmarked according to three 
situations including Nash, retailers’ leadership and 
manufacturers’ leadership Stackelberg conditions.  
3. Proposed Model  
In this section, the game-theoretic, mathematical modelling, supply chain, and coordination contract assumptions 
(section 3.1) will first be presented. The CSR indicator is then discussed and selected (section 3.2) for further 
purposes. Next, the notations for mathematical modelling are illustrated and the payoff function for two-player 
SC members is demonstrated (section 3.3).  
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3.1. Problem description and assumptions 
In this research, a two-echelon supply chain including a manufacturer and a retailer dealing with a single product 
is considered. The final product demand function is dependent on price, advertising costs, and social responsibility 
measuring indices. Among the demand function variables, social responsibility (forced labour ratio) and price 
have an inverse relation with demand. Note that D is demand, 𝜃 is a fixed coefficient of demand function, α 
presents the retailer's price (𝑃  ) elasticity, β denotes the elasticity of advertising costs (𝐶  ) and γ measures the 
impact of corporate social responsibility (𝐶𝑆𝑅 ) measuring index efforts, as presented in Equation (1).  
 
𝐷 = 𝜃. 𝑃 . 𝐶 . 𝐶𝑆𝑅  Eq. (1) 
 
The retailer pays for advertising costs and the manufacturer is responsible for social responsibility costs. Based 
upon game theory classifications, both parties have access to complete information with a non-repetitive game 
and enjoy cooperative behaviour. Accordingly, the Nash bargaining game and Stackelberg Leader-Follower game 
have been employed to analyse the applicability of the proposed model. In addition, coordination contracts for 
profit sharing, revenue sharing, two-part tariff and cost sharing in static and dynamic games have been 
investigated. Moreover, the best response from each decision variable for each player resulted from the Nash 
definition (Jia et al., 2013). By considering the Nash definition, each player will stimulate competitors beliefs or 
best responses and, while these beliefs are correct, Nash equilibrium will occur (Mahdiraji et al., 2015).  
The problem of SC coordination is modelled assuming equal bargaining power of members as well as one player 
having dominant power. It should be noted that, in a profit-sharing contract, bargaining with regard to the profit 
realized by each member is based on agreement type. However, in the revenue sharing contract, the wholesale 
price is lower than the unit production cost, let alone its maintenance and ordering costs. Furthermore, in the TPT 
contract, the wholesale price is higher than the unit production cost and in addition to the wholesale price Wm, a 
fixed cost of tm is provided for the retailer. Eventually, the cost-sharing contract has been applied under sharing 
advertising costs. 
The proposed research methodology is composed of three stages. First of all, modelling the outcomes for the 
retailer and manufacturer are investigated. Secondly, the best responses for each player in both Nash and 
Stackelberg game situations is evaluated for four coordination contract types. Thirdly, using a numerical example, 
a sensitivity analysis of the corporate social responsibility measuring index is conducted as illustrated in Figure 
4. 
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Figure 4. Research stages  
3.2. Corporate Social Responsibility Measuring Indices 
There are various references for classifying social responsibility indicators. One of the most common includes the 
Global Slavery Index (GSI) that relates directly to the use of forced labour. However, through the literature review, 
the authors have identified a number of indices that previous researchers have identified as means by which to  
quantify social responsibility, as summarized in Table 3.  
Table3. Measures s of social responsibility (Source: Authors) 
Research Quantitative indicators examined 
(Azapagic & Perdan, 2000) Distribution of income 
Job satisfaction 
(ICheme, 2002) Staff turnover 
Promotion rate 





The collective bargaining agreements 
(Kruse et al., 2009) Working hours 
(de Bloom, et al., 2009) Vacation 
(Cascio, 2010) Dismissal of employees 
(Lim, Chan, & Dallimore, 2010) 
 
Full-time and part-time employees 
Years of service 
(GRI, 2011) Employee safety training 
(DPE, 2011) Collective bargaining agreements 




(OECD, 2012) Job dissatisfaction 
(Katsikea et al., 2014) Staff turnover  
(Kwon & Milgrom, 2014) Promotion rate (promotion) 
(Mani et al., 2014) Wage levels between the sexes 
(Simoes et al., 2016) Staff turnover 
(Strandberg et al., 2017) Vacation 
(ILO, 2017; Mahdiraji et al., 2019) Forced labour 
3.1. Illustrating through a numerical
example
3.2. Solving coordination contracts
based upon numerical example and
comparing the results




2.1. Modelling four coordination
contracts
2.2. Examining the concavity of
each coordination contract
2.3. Exploring the best responses
of each player in both Nash and
Stackelberg conditions for each
coordination contract
Stage (2)
1.1. Modelling payoff functions
of retailer and manufacturer
1.2. Examining the concavity of
the payoff functions cosidering
each decision variable




The above-mentioned indicators are considered in different research efforts. Note that there are several references 
to classify CSR indicators. Some of these indicators have resulted from the combination of CSR with other 
sustainability pillars. In this regard, environmental performance indicators are used to modify CSR metrics in the 
literature (e.g., Searcy et al., 2016; Prasad et al., 2019). There are no preferences among these indicators; however, 
those emanating from the GRI global report and modified for a specific situation are more respectable. Moreover, 
there is an annual report regarding Corporate Responsibility Indicators from the united nations that are also 
popular. 
Ciliberti et al. (2011) analysed CSR codes and principal-agent problems in supply chains. Using four case studies, 
they evaluated the impact of SA8000. SA8000 is a voluntary accountability standard developed by Social 
Accountability International (SAI) in 1997 that is mainly based on the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
and International Labour Organisation (ILO) conventions (Leipziger, 2001; Liu et al., 2019). The findings of this 
research suggest that implementing the SA8000 code of practice reduces the information asymmetry and thereby 
enhances transparency amongst the members of a supply chain. Moreover, this minimizes opportunistic behaviour 
amongst the supply chain network as well as reducing moral hazards.  However, this does not necessarily convince 
customers to add a premium to the costs of their products to mitigate against the cost of implementing the code.  
Accident indicators, number of reported accidents per year, health coverage, number of employees with social 
security, health insurance, ratio of male to female employees, level of payment between genders, income 
distribution among employees and forced labour factors are all key indicators for measuring sustainability and 
social responsibility (Mahdiraji et al., 2019). Among them, forced labour is defined as “All work or service that 
is exacted from any person under the menace of any penalty and for which the said person has not offered himself 
voluntarily” (ILO, 2017, online). This term is classified in Figure 5 by the International Labour Organization 
(ILO).  
 










State Imposed Forced Labour
Forced Labour Exploitation
Forced Sexual Exploitation of Adults and Commercial Sexual 
Exploitation of ChildrenForced Marriage
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In our research, the forced labour section, including all three subsidiaries, has been considered in our proposed 




Figure 6. Forced Labour Information (Source: ILO, 2016; ILO, 2017) 
As indicated earlier, the authors use forced labour as a proxy for negative CSR that ultimately leads to bad 
publicity and loss of reputation and business in a supply chain. The main assumptions are that a larger percentage 
use of forced labour in a supply network would lead to bad publicity and a decline in the demand for the product 
or service. Therefore, the network would need to spend more effort and money on advertising and marketing to 
mitigate this negative impact. This leads to an increment in the total cost of products or services in the network. 
As mentioned earlier, the authors introduce forced labour 𝐵𝐿  as the quantitative measure representing the 
percentage of registered forced labour amongst SC members (Mahdiraji et al., 2019). Next, this index is included 
in the SC models through the demand function, as based on Table 4.  
Table 4. Selected Index Description (Source: Mahdiraji et al., 2019) 
ID  BL ratio 
Descriptions  Percent forced labour working in the supply chain  
Formula  𝐵𝐿 = × 100  Eq. (2) 
 
Unit of measure  Percentage  
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Measuring range  Minimum 0 and a maximum of 100% (0 ≤ 𝐵𝐿𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 ≤ 1) 
Process  Less, better  
Scale  Whole supply chain 
Scheduling  Periodically based on demand  
Audiences  Management; Customer; Public audits; Government 
Additional explanation  This indicator should be part of external auditing  
In equation (2), BL is the amount of registered (forced) labour in an SC network and 𝑁  denotes the total number 
of employees. This indicator has been derived from the ratio of forced labour to the total number of employees at 
the desired level, which therefore has an inverse relationship to demand function (Mahdiraji et al., 2019). 
Considering equation (1) and (2), the final demand function is presented as follows.  
𝐷 = 𝜃. 𝑃 . 𝐶 . 𝐶𝑆𝑅
𝐶𝑆𝑅 = 𝐵𝐿 =
→  𝐷 = 𝜃. 𝑃 . 𝐶 . 𝐵𝐿   Eq. ( 3) 
Where D is demand, α the price elasticity, β the elasticity of advertising, and γ measures the elasticity of social 
responsibility measuring index efforts.  
3.3. Mathematical model 
Table 5 provides a list of variables and symbols used in our model. Here, the retailer is 𝑅 and manufacturer is 𝑀. 
In addition, F stands for mathematical function, P for parameters and V for decision variables. Note that the 
MATLAB software was used for determining and solving optimal values in the subsequent sections. 
Table 5. Symbols used for modelling retailer and manufacturer implications  







G  F  profit margin  
TR  F total revenue 
TC  F total cost 
π  F payoff 
THC  F total holding cost 
TOC  F total ordering cost 
TMC  F total marketing cost 
C  P ordering cost 
C  P holding cost per unit 
P  P selling price 
C  V marketing costs per unit 
Q  V ordering quantity 
Ζ V retail price ratio in a contract 
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G  F  profit margin  
TR  F total revenue 
TC  F total cost  
π  F payoff 
THC  F total holding cost 
TOSC  F setup and ordering cost 
TBC  F total purchase/buy cost 
TSC  F total shortages/ stock out cost 
TPC  F total production cost 
TO  F total ordering cost 
TS  F total setup cost 
TRC  F manufacturer’s total related costs 
φ  F demand ratio on manufacturers capacity 
CSR  F social responsibility measurement index 
L  P total number of employees 
BL  P number of registered labour workforce 
PC  P production capacity 
C  P setup costs 
u  P cost function per unit product 
δ  P coefficient of scale advantage 
C  P holding cost per unit 
C  P shortages cost per unit 
C  P raw material purchase costs per unit 
C  P production costs per unit 
η  P social responsibility criteria for each product  
C  P ordering cost  
P  V wholesale price 
Q  V production quantity 










D F demand function 
BL  F labour income index for measuring social responsibility 
Ε P BL ratio coefficient 
θ, α, β, γ P demand coefficient, price elasticity, advertising, social responsibility  
Θ P price ratio coefficient in a contract 
ℶ V profit-sharing contract coefficient 
Α V bargaining power 
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Player Icon Symbol Type Description 
t  V two-part tariff contract coefficient 
Ρ V revenue sharing contract coefficient 
w   V wholesale price in a contract 
Ω V cost-sharing contract coefficient 
The retailer’s income is derived from multiplying the profit margin against the product demand. The profit margin 
of the retailer, Eq. (4), results from the difference between the wholesale purchase price and the retail price to the 
final customer.  
𝑇𝑅 = 𝐺 × 𝐷
𝐺 = 𝑃 − 𝑃
→ 𝑇𝑅 = [𝑃 − 𝑃 ] × 𝜃. 𝑃 . 𝐶 . 𝐵𝐿   Eq. (4) 
The retailers total cost (𝑇𝐶 ) includes holding (𝑇𝐻𝐶 ), ordering (𝑇𝑂𝐶 ) and advertising costs (𝑇𝑀𝐶 ), as given in Eq. 
(5). Note that the economic order quantity (EOQ) model has been considered for the retailer (Mahdiraji et al., 
2014, 2015).  
𝑇𝐶 = 𝑇𝑀𝐶 + 𝑇𝑂𝐶 + 𝑇𝐻𝐶
𝑇𝑀𝐶 = 𝐷 × 𝐶












→ 𝑇𝐶 = 𝜃. 𝑃 . 𝐶 . 𝐵𝐿 × 𝐶 + 𝐶 . 𝑄 + (
1
2
× 𝑄  × 𝐶 × 𝑃 ) Eq. (5) 
The retailers supply the product from the manufacturer and are responsible for selling them to the final customer. 
(Lee et al., 1996; Esmaeili et al., 2009; Ma et al., 2013; Jia et al., 2013; Mahdiraji et al., 2015, 2019). The retailers 
costs include the costs of ordering, holding and advertising spent on each product. To illustrate the retailer's profit 
function, 𝜋  has been derived from the difference between income and retailer costs. The retailer’s restrictions 
include a positive profit margin and a demand greater than zero while requiring less than the manufacturer’s 
production capacity. Accordingly, the retailer payoff function is designed as follows. 
𝜋 = 𝜃. 𝑃 . 𝐶 . 𝐵𝐿 × [𝑃 − 𝑃 − 𝐶 ] − 𝐶 . 𝑄 − ( ×  𝑄 × 𝐶 × 𝑃 )  Eq. (6) 
The manufacturer’s profit is derived from the wholesale income minus costs of purchasing raw materials, shortage 
costs (𝑇𝐵𝐶 ), setup costs, production costs (𝑇𝑃𝐶 ), holding costs and cost of advertisement to mitigate against the 
impact of forced labour (Wang & Tang, 2009; Oganezov, 2006; Chakraborty et al., 2010; Chang, 2008; Pentico 
et al., 2009; Jia et al., 2013; Mahdiraji et al., 2014, 2015). Shortages are effectively compensated for by delayed 
orders. The manufacturer has a warehouse for storing the final product. The total income of the manufacturer 
(𝑇𝑅 ) consists of multiplying the manufacturer's profit margin by the demand. The profit margin for the 
manufacturer has been derived from the difference between the wholesale price and production costs and cost of 
implementing social responsibility, according to Eq. (7).  
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𝑇𝑅 = 𝐺 × 𝐷
𝐺 = 𝑃 − 𝐶 − 𝐶 − 𝜂 𝐵𝐿
𝑇𝐵𝐶 = 𝐶 × 𝐷
→ 𝑇𝑅 = [𝑃 − 𝐶 − 𝜂 𝐵𝐿 ] × 𝜃. 𝑃 . 𝐶 . 𝐵𝐿   Eq. (7) 
Total setup costs for the manufacturer (𝑇𝑆𝑀) and the cost of ordering raw materials from the suppliers (𝑇𝑂 ) are 
presented in Eq. (8) based on the economic production quantity (EPQ) model with shortages.  
𝑇𝑂𝑆𝐶 = 𝑇𝑂 + 𝑇𝑆
𝑇𝑆 = 𝐶 ×
𝑇𝑂 = 𝐶 × ⎭
⎬
⎫
→  𝑇𝑂𝑆𝐶 = [𝐶 + 𝐶 ] ×
. . .
  Eq. (8) 
The total cost of production (𝑇𝑃𝐶 ) includes the cost of production per unit (𝐶 ) multiplied by the demand. Note 
that the variable cost of production per unit is considered to be a function of product demand (𝑢 × 𝐷 ). As 
demand increases, due to scale advantage the variable cost of production will decrease and is represented as a 
coefficient of the scale 𝛿 (Mahdiraji et al., 2015), as per Eq. (9).  
𝑇𝑃𝐶 = 𝐶 × 𝐷
𝐶 = 𝑢 × 𝐷
 𝑖𝑓   0 <  𝛿 < 1 , 𝑢 > 0
→ 𝑇𝑃𝐶 = 𝑢 × 𝐷 = 𝑢 × 𝜃 . 𝑃 .( ). 𝐶 .( ). 𝐵𝐿 .( ) Eq. (9) 
The total inventory-related costs for the manufacturer (𝑇𝑅𝐶 ) include the final product handling cost (𝑇𝐻𝐶 ) and 
shortage costs (𝑇𝑆𝐶 ) (Wang & Tang, 2009; Oganezov, 2006; Chakraborty et al., 2010; Chang, 2008; Pentico et 
al., 2009; Razavi Hajiagha et al., 2015), as represented in equation (10). It should be noted that the EPQ model 
with shortages has been considered for the manufacturer.  
𝑇𝑅𝐶 = 𝑇𝐻𝐶 + 𝑇𝑆𝐶
𝑇𝐻𝐶 = 𝐶 ×
(𝜑 × 𝑄 − 𝐵 )  
2 × 𝜑 × 𝑄
𝑇𝑆𝐶 =
𝐶 × 𝐵
2 × 𝜑 × 𝑄
















𝜃. 𝑃 . 𝐶 . 𝐵𝐿
𝑃𝐶
) × 𝑄 − 𝐵 )  
2 × (1 −









⎛ 𝐶 × 𝐵
2 × (1 −








The total profit earned by the manufacturer (𝜋 ) is the difference between total revenue and total costs, as follows.  






























4. Coordination Modelling  
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In this section, the authors first present the general form of each coordination contract. Afterward, the modelling 
process for each contract including profit sharing (section 4.1), revenue sharing (section 4.2), two-part tariff 
(section 4.3) and cost-sharing contract (section 4.4) are demonstrated.  
In a supply chain network, it is clear that not all of the members will enjoy equal power relations. In an ideal 
situation, there is usually a supply chain ‘champion’ who comes forward to coordinate activities to streamline the 
material flows and reduce the information asymmetry amongst its members and ensure transparency in accounting 
practices (Hajiagha et al., 2015a, 2015b). However, our recent literature review clearly indicates that supply chain 
relationships are still far from a partnership amongst equals. The culture of gameplay engendered through 
information hoarding and passing on costs to the weaker party is still rampant in SCs, which could lead to serious 
financial concerns in terms of ensuring the sustainability of the business. Who pays for the advertising and 
marketing cost to mitigate against the impacts of forced labour, and who bears any other losses due to loss of 
demand is a major conflict. 
Coordination contracts in SC offer a way to illustrate how each member is affected by different financial 
relationships. The authors portray the gameplay nature of different members in an SC using the Nash and 
Stackelberg models. As mentioned earlier, the Nash model considers all members of SC equal in terms of decision 
making. However, the Stackelberg model presents a scenario whereby the SC has a leader-follower nature and 
there is information asymmetry and power imbalance that leads to a shift of costs onto the follower. In order to 
further investigate the Nash and Stackelberg models, the authors adopted the following process:  
[1]. The best responses of the retailer are obtained from its payoff function; 
[2]. The retailer's best responses are used in the manufacturer payoff function to derive the profit function; 
[3]. The manufacturer’s best responses are obtained; 
[4]. For the Nash condition, the manufacturer’s bargaining power, 𝜇, and the retailers, (1 − 𝜇),  are considered; 
accordingly, the Nash bargaining model, as based upon equation (12), is applied (Zhang, 2012). 
Eq. (12) max (𝜋 ∗) . (𝜋 ∗)   
[5]. To find the equilibrium, the first derivation of the above function is utilized in equation (13). Note that 𝑋 is 

















[6]. Finally, the best solutions found in steps 2 to 5 are examined in detail to evaluate the Nash and Stackelberg 
game situations. These steps are further employed for each coordinating contract, as described in the 
following subsections.  
4.1. Profit-Sharing Contract 
An additional parameter ℶ (profit sharing coefficient) is added to reflect the contractual relationship between the 
retailer and manufacturer as presented in equations (14) and (15), respectively. 
Eq. (14) 𝜋 = ℶ. ( 𝜃. 𝑃 . 𝐶 . 𝐵𝐿 × [𝑃 − 𝑃 − 𝐶 ] − 𝐶 . 𝑄 + (− × 𝑄 × 𝐶 × 𝑃 ) ) 
E
q. (15) 





































In fact, ℶ (0 ≤ ℶ ≤ 1) is a coefficient that effectively divides the profit derived from the agreement between two 
players. This coefficient reflects the fact that the retailer’s profit increases proportionally to the manufacturer’s 
loss of profit. By using the Hessian matrix, the authors concluded that the profit function is concave to all 
variables. By obtaining the first derivation from the retailer and manufacture functions and solving the associated 
set of equations, the authors obtained an optimal response for each player as illustrated in equations 16 to 22 and 
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√𝟐. 𝑪𝑹 𝑷𝑴 𝑪𝑷𝑴
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 𝑰𝑭 𝜺 > 𝟏  
Considering the Nash game condition, Eq. (23) is used to compute  (𝛼) and (1 − 𝛼): 
Eq. (23) max (𝜋ℶ∗) . (𝜋ℶ∗)  
In order to find the equilibrium factor, Eqs. (24) to (26) are used:  

























= 0, ℶ  












= 0, 𝜇  
All of the above cases have been coded and solved using the MATLAB software. In the Nash model, the best 
responses functions 𝑄 ∗   , 𝑃 ∗   , 𝐶 ∗, 𝑄 ∗, 𝐵 ∗, 𝑃 ∗, 𝐵𝐿 ∗   , ℶ∗ ,𝜇∗ and fundamental constraints of Eqs. (27) 
to (33) are solved simultaneously for optimal solutions. Eqs. (27), (28) and (33) present the scale of the 
coefficients, and (29), (30) and (31) denote that the demand is non-negative and less than production capacity for 
the retailer, whilst Eq. (32) indicates that the retailer’s final price is higher than wholesale price.   
Eq. (27) 0 ≤ 𝜇∗ ≤ 1 
Eq. (28) 0 ≤ 𝐵𝐿 ∗ ≤ 1 
Eq. (29) 𝐷 = 𝜃. 𝑃 . 𝐶 . 𝐵𝐿  
Eq. (30) 𝐷 ≤ 𝑃𝐶  
Eq. (31) 𝐷 ≥ 0 
Eq. (32) 𝑃 − 𝑃 > 0 
Eq. (33) 0 ≤ ℶ∗ ≤ 1 
To model the retailer as the leader in the Stackelberg game, the manufacturer is assumed to be the follower. In 
this model, maximizing the retailer’s profit by incorporating the best response functions from the manufacturer is 
considered. Therefore, the objective function is to maximize the profit of the retailer, whilst the limits to this 
function are the manufacture’s rationality and their best responses. On the other hand, the manufacturer could be 
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considered to be the leader, thus maximizing the manufacturer’s profit by considering the best responses to the 
retailer is of concern. Therefore, the objective function is to maximize the manufacturer’s overall profit, as limited 
by the retailer’s rationality and his best responses as model constraints. Considering the above conditions, the 
retailer leadership and manufacture leadership models can be described as per Eqs. (34) and (35), respectively.  
𝑀𝐴𝑋 𝜋  Eq. (34) 
s.t: 
Eq. (19, 20, 21, 22, 25, 26, 27-33) 
ℶ∗   , 𝜇∗   
𝑀𝐴𝑋 𝜋   Eq. (35) 
s.t: 
Eq. (16, 17, 18, 25, 26, 27-33) 
ℶ∗ ,𝜇∗ 
4.2. Revenue sharing contract 
A revenue sharing contract encourages the retailer to increase their inventory level, where the manufacturer is 
obliged to meet orders at a lower price than the usual wholesale price and, in return, the retailer pays them a share 
of the final sale price of the goods. Here, the manufacturer, by providing goods at low prices, encourages the 
retailer to store more goods in their warehouse. Hence, for unsold products, only a part of excess inventory risk 
will be assumed by the retailer. Suppose that a retailer buys their product from a manufacturer at wholesale price 
(𝑤) and sells it to the final consumer at price (𝑃 ). The size of the retailer’s order is determined according to the 
cost function and market demand by an amount 𝑄 . In the revenue-sharing contract, the wholesale price is reduced 
from (𝑤) to (𝑤  ), and a (1 − 𝜌) share of the total income obtained by the retailer is paid to the manufacturer. 
Therefore, in Eq. (36) the wholesale price is less than the unit production cost despite the holding and ordering 
costs.  
Eq. (36) 



































Note that 0 < 𝜌 < 1; thus, in this condition, the retailer and manufacturer’s profit functions will be as depicted in 
Eqs. (37) and (38), respectively.  
Eq. (37) 




























− 𝐶 + 𝐶 ×
. . .
+ 𝜌. 𝑃 . 𝑄   
 
The coefficient ρ relates to the decrease in profit assumed by the retailer and the corresponding increase in profit 
realized by the manufacturer. It is worth noting that the profit functions of the retailer and manufacturer meet the 
concave criteria for all included variables. Eqs. (39)-(45) provide the retailer and manufacturer mathematical 
treatise to seek optimal responses, and are presented as follows.  




Eq. (40) 𝑃 ∗ =
. . . . × [  ] . . . .
. . . .
 𝑖𝑓𝜁 > 1  
Eq. (41) 𝐶 ∗ =  −
. . . . .
.( )











𝐵 ∗ = √2.

















 𝐼𝐹 𝜗 > 1  
Eq. (45) 𝐵𝐿 ∗ = .
. . .
( )
 𝐼𝐹 𝜀 > 1  
Note that in the Nash model, the best players’ responses are 𝑄 ∗   , 𝑃 ∗   , 𝐶 ∗, 𝑄 ∗, 𝐵 ∗, 𝑃 ∗, 𝐵𝐿 ∗ , 𝜌∗, 𝜇∗ 
with the constraints described by Eqs. (27) to (32), and where Eqs. (36) and (46) are solved simultaneously by 
LINGO. 
Eq. (46) 0 ≤ 𝜌∗ ≤ 1 
For retailers and manufacturers, the Stackelberg leadership conditions (47) and (48) are solved, respectively.  











𝜌∗ , 𝜇∗ 
4.3. TPT Contract 
In a TPT contract, the manufacturer, in addition to the wholesale price of (𝑤  ), provides a fixed cost (𝑡  ) that 
is independent of the retailer’s order quantity. The profits gained by the manufacturer and retailer are given by 
Eqs. (49) and (50). 
Eq. (49) 𝜋 = 𝜃. 𝑃 . 𝐶 . 𝐵𝐿 × [𝑃 − 𝑤  − 𝐶 ] − 𝐶 . 𝑄 + (− ×  𝑄 × 𝐶 × 𝑃 ) − 𝑡     
Eq. (50) 
























− 𝐶 + 𝐶 .
. . .
+ 𝑡    
The profit function of the retailer is concave to all variables. By obtaining the first derivation from the retailer and 
manufacturer functions and solving the equations so obtained, the best responses are presented as follows, 
including Eqs. (51) to (57). 
Eq. (51) 𝑄 ∗ =  √2 ×
× ×  
× × ×
  
Eq. (52) 𝑃 ∗ = −
× . . × ×
×( )
  
Eq. (53) 𝐶 ∗ =  −
𝛽. 𝐶 − 𝑃 × 𝑄 . 𝛽 + 𝑃 × 𝑄 . 𝛽
𝑄 . (1 + 𝛽)










































 𝐼𝐹 𝜗 > 1  
Eq. (57) 




















 𝐼𝐹 𝜀 > 1  
 
In the Nash model, the best responses functions, including 𝑄 ∗ ,𝑃 ∗ ,𝐶 ∗,𝑄 ∗, 𝐵 ∗, 𝑃 ∗, 𝐵𝐿 ∗, 𝑡  
∗ and 𝜇∗, 
as well as the constraints described in Eqs. (27) to (32) and Eq. (58) are solved simultaneously to obtain the 
equilibrium. 
Eq. (58) 0 ≤ 𝑡  
∗ ≤ 1 
For retailers and manufacturers, the Stackelberg leadership conditions (59) and (60) should be solved, 
respectively.  
𝑀𝐴𝑋 𝜋  Eq. (59) 
s.t  
Eq. (54-57) 
Eq. (27-32, 58) 
𝑡  
∗ , 𝜇∗  
𝑀𝐴𝑋 𝜋  Eq. (60) 
s.t 
Eq. (51-53) 
Eq. (27-32, 58) 
𝑡  
∗ , 𝜇∗ 
4.4. Cost-sharing contract 
A cost-sharing contract is used when the manufacturer and retailer both share the marketing costs, but which are 
paid by the retailer. This contract can play an important role in establishing coordination. The retailer and 
manufacturer models are represented in Eqs. (61) and (62), respectively. 
Eq. (61) 𝜋 = 𝜃. 𝑃 . 𝐶 . 𝐵𝐿 × [𝑃 − 𝑤  − (𝜔). 𝐶 ] − 𝐶 . 𝑄 + (− ×  𝑄 × 𝐶 × 𝑃 )   
Eq. (62) 
























− 𝐶 + 𝐶 ×
. . .   
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The profit functions for both the retailer and manufacturer are concave for all variables. By obtaining the first 
derivative from the retailer and manufacturer functions and solving the equations so obtained, the best response 
function of each player for each decision variable can be illustrated as follows in Eqs. (63) to (69).  




Eq. (64) 𝑃 ∗ =
. . . . . .
×( )
  
Eq. (65) 𝐶 ∗ =  −
. . . . .
. ( )











𝐵 ∗ = √2.

















 𝐼𝐹 𝜗 > 1  
Eq. (69) 𝐵𝐿 ∗ = .
. . . . .
( )
 𝐼𝐹 𝜀 > 1  
In the Nash model, best response equations include 𝑄 ∗   , 𝑃 ∗   , 𝐶 ∗, 𝑄 ∗, 𝐵 ∗, 𝑃 ∗, 𝐵𝐿 ∗ , 𝜇∗  and 𝜔∗ with 
regard to the constraints described, and Eqs. (26) to (31) and (70) should be solved simultaneously. 
Eq. (70) 0 ≤ 𝜔∗  ≤ 1 
For retailers and manufacturers, the Stackelberg leadership conditions (71) and (72) should be considered, 
respectively. 
𝑀𝐴𝑋 𝜋  Eq. (71) 
s.t  
Eq. (66-69) 
Eq. (27-32, 70) 
𝜇∗  , 𝜔∗ 
𝑀𝐴𝑋 𝜋  Eq. (72) 
s.t 
Eq. (63-65) 
Eq. (27-32, 70) 
𝜇∗  , 𝜔∗  
5. Testing the Model 
The authors benchmarked the performance of the four coordination models under bot the Nash and Stackelberg 
game-playing situations in a considered two-echelon SC. The numerical data (initial conditions) for the various 
relevant parameters are presented in Table 6.  
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Table 6. Initial conditions used the model (Source: Authors) 
𝜃 𝛼 𝛽 𝛾 𝑢  𝛿  𝑃𝐶  𝐶  Ζ 
3 2.25 1.05 1.61 4 0.01 15 10 1.1 
𝐶  𝐶  𝐶  𝐶  𝐶  𝜀 𝜗 𝐶   
0.5 1 4 7 5 1.1 1.1 0.15 
The Nash and Stackelberg models are optimized using a global solver in LINGO. The sensitivity of the forced 
labour ratio for the four contracts in the Nash mode have been analysed. As illustrated in Fig. 7, the revenue and 
profit-sharing contracts are not apparently affected by changes in the forced labour ratio. Moreover, Figs. 7(b) 
and 7(d) indicate the inverse relationship between profit and the proportion of forced labour for cost-sharing and 
two-part tariff contracts, respectively. Note that the x-axis represents the BLratio and the y-axis the profit from SC 
based upon each contract, in USD.  
 
Figure 7(b). cost-sharing contract  
 
Figure 7(a). revenue-sharing contract  
 
Figure 7(d). TPT contract  
 
Figure 7(c). profit-sharing contract  
Moreover, as presented in Fig. 8, when comparing contracts in the Nash model the TPT and cost-sharing contracts 
show greater profitability. The degree of sensitivity of the two-part tariff is much greater. Note that the x-axis 
represents the BLratio and the y-axis the changes in profit from SC based upon each contract, in per cent. 
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Figure 8. Nash Model results for all contracts  
Secondly, the sensitivity of negative CSR due to forced labour is investigated considering the retailer Stackelberg 
leadership game. The results indicated that SC profit is not particularly sensitive to changes in forced labour. 
Moreover, TPT and cost-sharing contracts showed greater profits. Ultimately, the sensitivity analysis of the forced 
labour ratio for manufacturer leadership games was investigated. As analysed, the sensitivity of the profit and 
social responsibility was strictly observed in profit-sharing contracts; however, in other cases, this sensitivity was 
found to be close to zero. For manufacturer leadership, the results of comparing coordination contracts show the 
same results. 
Profitability changes for each player in the Nash and Stackelberg games are depicted in relation to changes in 
forced labour ratio. The interpretations of each image have been briefly summarized in Table 7. Note that the x-
axis represents the BLratio and the y-axis the profit of the retailer and manufacturer (in two different colours) based 
on each contract, in USD. 
Table 7. Nash mode comparing retailer and manufacturer profits separately for each contract type  
In the revenue-sharing 
contract, the profitability 
of the retailer is always 
greater than that of the 
manufacturer because of 
the fact that the 
manufacturer has assumed 












 0.001  0.01  0.2  0.4  0.6  0.8  0.9  1
Revenue sharing Cost sharing Profit sharing TPT
 0.001  0.01  0.2  0.4  0.6  0.8  0.9  1
retailer-revenue contract manufacture-revenue contract
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ratio of the forced labour, 
which leads to loss (unless 
this ratio reaches zero). 
In the cost-sharing 
contract, the profitability 
of the retailer is always 
greater than that of the 
manufacturer. However, if 
both players benefit from 
greater profitability, the 
forced labour ratio 
approaches zero. Note that 
the maximum BLratio is 1% 
worldwide  
 
In the profit-sharing 
contract, with regard to the 
forced labour ratio, both 
parties suffer losses, 
though these losses are 
much higher for the 
manufacturer than the 
retailer  
The two-part tariff contract 
is the same as the cost-
sharing contract.  
 
To avoid repetition, in the Stackelberg mode by comparing retailer and manufacturer profits, the results indicated 
that:  
 0.001  0.01  0.2  0.4  0.6  0.8  0.9  1
retailer-cost sharing  contract manufacture-cost sharing  contract
 0.001  0.01  0.2  0.4  0.6  0.8  0.9  1
retailer-profitt sharing  contract manufacture-profit sharing  contract
 0.001  0.01  0.2  0.4  0.6  0.8  0.9  1
retailer-Two-part tariff  contract manufactureTwo-part tariff  contract
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[1]. In the revenue-sharing contract, profitability is very high for the retailer. Therefore, social responsibility 
costs in the Stackelberg model are recommended for consideration by the retailer;  
[2]. With a zero forced labour ratio, the retailer obtains the highest profit. Accordingly, in the cost-sharing 
contract, this ratio is recommended more for the retailer’s Stackelberg mode; 
[3]. In the profit-sharing contract, the recommendations are the same as for cost-sharing. However, 
profitability is minimal; thus, social responsibility is better not to be considered;  
[4]. In the TPT contract, in order to prevent the loss of players, social responsibility has to be taken seriously, 
otherwise, especially in the manufacturer leadership mode, considerable losses will result.  
6. Discussion and Implications 
Generally, corporate social responsibility is one of the most important and distinct dimensions in supply chain 
management. Very little research has been performed in the area of social responsibility, with the majority of 
research focussing on the economic and environmental fields. Furthermore, the social responsibility requirement 
is of particular importance to consumers and company shareholders. Thus, in this research, the quantitative and 
measurable social responsibility index called the forced labour ratio in the SC has been examined. The decisions 
made by the members of a supply chain play a direct role in determining the profits of each member. These 
decisions are occasionally in conflict with other members in a competitive environment. In this paper, 
contradictory variables, including the costs arising from observing corporate social responsibility, inventory and 
stock-outs, advertising costs and pricing in a two-echelon SC that includes a manufacturer and a retailer, have 
been considered. Because CSR requirements are often imposed on manufacturers by shareholders, governments, 
and customers, the cost of social responsibility is generally assumed by the manufacturer, whilst the retailer is 
responsible for advertising the final product due to their direct relationship with the customer. The manufacturer 
and the retailer outcomes were modelled, and the best responses were obtained for each player. Afterward, Nash 
and Stackelberg conditions, assuming leadership by either the retailer and the manufacturer for four different 
coordination contracts (revenue sharing, profit sharing, cost sharing, and TPT) were modelled. Eventually, by 
nonlinear optimization, the sensitivity analysis of the social responsibility index (BLratio) was investigated. 
According to the results presented above, in the Nash model, revenue and profit-sharing contracts were rarely 
sensitive to BLratio changes; in the Stackelberg mode of the retailer’s leadership, revenue sharing, and profit-
sharing and TPT contracts were rarely sensitive; and in the Stackelberg model of the manufacturer leadership, the 
same was true of revenue sharing, cost-sharing and TPT contracts. 
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Theoretically speaking, since 2009, except for a notable few research efforts (Panda, 2014; Hesueh, 2014; Hong 
& Guo, 2019; Mahdiraji et al., 2019) the CSR concept has not been quantitatively analysed in any broad sense. 
However, in this research, CSR, and its effects on SC profitability, have been considered in detail. In this regard, 
one concept or sub-criterion of the CSR, that of forced labour, has been selected as the most deterministic factor 
(Mahdiraji et al., 2019). The effects of the chosen criteria on the profitability of SC and its members was analysed 
through four coordination contracts in a given two-echelon supply chain. Furthermore, CSR was considered and 
analysed quantitatively, and the benchmarking for four coordination contracts was illustrated. As a result, 
contracts including profit and revenue sharing were found not to be sensitive to CSR changes; however, the TPT 
and cost-sharing contracts were extremely sensitive to changes in CSR. 
For application implications, note that in real-world cases, considering the 3.4 billion members of the worldwide 
workforce, nearly 25 million can be considered to be in forced labour, or 0.7%. This rate for Asia and the Pacific, 
as the sector with the greatest proportion of forced labour, is nearly 1%. Thus, the results for the higher amount 
of BLratio have fortunately not yet occurred in a real-world scenario. The results in Fig. 7 and Table 7 illustrate that 
for a BLratio greater than 20%, the players and supply chain in any contract type will incur losses. By comparing 
the manufacturer’s and retailer’s profit in the Nash and Stackelberg modes, as based upon coordination contracts, 
one find the following results. In the Nash game, revenue sharing contracts result in higher profitability for the 
retailer than the manufacturer. Thus, the manufacturer has incurred costs by being obliged to reduce the forced 
labour ratio, leading to losses unless the ratio can be brought to zero. Moreover, in a revenue sharing contract with 
Stackelberg conditions, profitability will be very high for the retailer. Therefore, it is recommended that the retailer 
also consider observing the appropriate social responsibility. Further, under Nash equilibrium conditions, for the 
cost-sharing contract, the profitability of the retailer is always greater than that of the manufacturer. Table 8 
compares the suitability of each contract for each player and the supply chain. 
Table 8. Comparison of all considered scenarios  
Game Type Contract Type Results for Retailer 
Results for 
Manufacturer 
Results for Supply chain  
Nash bargaining game; 
(static) 
Revenue Sharing    
Cost Sharing    
Profit-Sharing    




Revenue Sharing    
Cost Sharing    
Profit-Sharing    
TPT    
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Game Type Contract Type Results for Retailer 
Results for 
Manufacturer 
Results for Supply chain  
  Loss () Profit ()  
Contrary to previous modes in the Nash game and profit-sharing contract, both sides will suffer losses, which will 
be much higher for the manufacturer. In the Stackelberg-profit sharing contract, profitability is minimal even if 
social responsibility is not observed. The interpretation of the Nash-TPT contract is similar to that of the Nash-
cost sharing contract. In the Stackelberg-TPT, social responsibility requires a degree of control to prevent losses 
being incurred by the players; otherwise, huge loss will be incurred. 
Moreover, to use the designed approach in real-world cases and situations, a few points should be considered. 
First, should the power of the retailer and manufacturer be equal (static game and Nash equilibrium), cost-sharing 
and TPT contracts are more productive for the chain. However, in leader-follower situations with a dominant 
player, whether this be the manufacturer or retailer, all contract types except TPT are profitable. Moreover, for 
Stackelberg game conditions, cost sharing is ranked first, and revenue sharing and profit sharing are ranked second 
and third, respectively. It is obvious that due to the negative indicator used for CSR in this research, agreements 
based on cost have higher priority than profit-based contracts. For a real-world situation, the structure below is 
proposed. 
 
Figure 9. Proposed structure  
After employing the proposed scheme, the designed model should be coded and solved by a relevant software 
(e.g. MATLAB). The results could determine the quantity, price, CSR indicator, etc. for each member of the 
supply chain.  
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This paper develops a non-linear mathematical model to determine the direct impact of ‘forced labour’ on supply 
chain profitability according to different contract types and static and dynamic games. Also, this is the first time 
that CSR has been considered in coordination contracts as a determining factor, and has been analysed 
accordingly. Also, the paper illustrates how game playing behaviour between the supply chain members can be 
modelled using the ‘Nash’ and ‘Stackelberg’ models. For practitioners, this paper provides guidelines to evaluate 
the impact of the negative CSR parameter, ‘forced labour’, on their profitability and, ultimately, the ‘bust’ scenario 
for their business. Moreover, business owners/managers should be able to determine the relative value of different 
coordination contracts and their implications for the supply chain for ‘Nash’ or ‘leader-follower’ relationships. 
Note that in this paper, the researchers have adopted a negative specific CSR indicator from the related literature; 
thus, investigating positive metrics such as income derived from social responsibility, the concept of consumer 
super-welfare could be considered in future studies. For the same reason, the review of coordination contracts as 
one of the mechanisms of collaboration with potential demand and social responsibility should be considered. 
Moreover, in this research, the authors considered the market and demand to be predictable, and hence applied a 
nonlinear deterministic demand function; nonetheless, an uncertain demand function is likely to be much more 
realistic in a real-world scenario. Accordingly, the authors propose the adoption of probabilistic (e.g., normal or 
uniform distribution functions) or stochastic demand functions or parameters for further investigation. It is worth 
noting here that coordination contracts’ structure and formulation should be redesigned for uncertain situations, 
as either stochastic or probabilistic. Besides, in this research, based on the literature review and studied papers 
(see Table 1), four coordination contracts were selected. Nevertheless, in future research, advanced purchasing 
discounts, quantity flexibility, options contracts, risk-sharing contracts, etc., might well be considered. These 
contracts have mainly been examined in uncertain demand modelling circumstances without considering CSR 
indicators. In addition, from a game theory perspective, Nash and Stackelberg equilibria and games were studied 
by the authors in this research. The aforementioned games are static and dynamic, respectively, with complete 
information. However, in real-world cases, incomplete and imperfect situations are highly like to exist or arise; 
thus, employing relevant games such as signalling games and pertinent equilibriums such as the Nash Perfect 
Equilibrium (NPE) could yield interesting results.   
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Appendix 1.  
Table 1. Related researches in the area of profit-sharing, revenue sharing, cost-sharing, and two-part tariff contracts 















































(A); Green & 
Sustainable 
(G) 
Krishnan & Winter, 2011 2 RS S L Q P/C 
Zhao & Shi, 2011 2 RS/D S L Q P 
Kaya, 2011 2 D/TPT/CS S L R C 
He & Khouja, 2011 2 RS/BB/PS S L Q C 
Toktas-Palut & Ülengin, 2011 2 CS S L Q P/Q 
Zhang et al, 2012 2 RS D L P P/Q 
Govindan et al, 2012 2 RS/BB/D S L Q P/Q 
Saha, 2013 2 RS/R/CS D L/N P/R P/Q/G 
Palsule-Desai, 2013 2 RS D L P P/C 
Ma et al, 2013 2 TPT D L P/A/L P/Q/C 
Panda, 2014 2 RS D L P C/P/Q/A 
Chen & Su, 2014 2 RS S L P P/Q 
Govindan & Popiuc, 2014 3 RS S L Q P/C 
Feng et al, 2014 2 RS S L Q C 
Hsueh, 2014 2 RS S L R P/Q/C 
Lei et al, 2015 2 IS/RS S L Q Q 
Seifbarghy et al, 2015 2 RS D N P/L P/Q 
Avinadav et al, 2015 2 RS/D D L P/L P 
Alaei & Setak, 2015 2 RS S L Q P/Q 
Cao et al, 2015 2 PS S L P P 
Ghosh & Shah, 2015 2 CS D L P/G P/Q/G 
Saha & Goyal, 2015 2 CS/D D L P P/Q 
Sluis & Giovanni, 2016 2 RS/BB/D/R D L Q C 
Modak et al, 2016 3 RS/D D N P P/C 
Weraikat et al, 2016 2 RS S L Q P/Q 
Hu et al, 2016 3 RS S L Q P 
Becker-Peth & Thonemann, 2016 2 RS S L Q Q 
Xu et al, 2016 2 RS/TPT D L P/G P/G 
Zhou et al, 2016 2 CS D L A/G P/G 
Zhang & Ren, 2016 3 CS/RS S L Q P 
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(A); Green & 
Sustainable 
(G) 
Yang et al, 2016 2 PS/RS S L Q Q 
Pfeiffer, 2016 2 TPT/D /RS D L P P/C 
Wang et al, 2016 2 D/CS S L P/G P/Q 
Xie & Liang, 2017 2 RS D L A P/C 
Hu & Feng, 2017 2 RS S L Q Q/C 
Peng et al, 2018 2 RS D L P/G P/G/Q 
Chakraborty et al, 2018 2 RS/CS D N A/P A/P/ 
Sher et al, 2018 2 CS D L P P/Q 
Hu et al, 2018 2 OC S L P P 
Hu et al, 2018 2 PS S L P P/Q 
Hong & Guo, 2019 2 CS/TPT S L P/G P/G/A 
Li et al, 2019 2 TPT S/D L P P 
Mahdiraji et al, 2019 2 RS/BB/R S N Q Q/P 
Mahdiraji et al, 2019 2 RS D N P/A/R Q/P/A 
Fan et al, 2019 2 PS S N P P/Q 
Adhikari et al, 2020 2 RS S N P P/Q 
Zhang et al, 2020 2 RS D L P P/Q 
Proposed Research 2 RS/CS/TPT/PS D N P/A/R Q/C/P/A 
 
